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Abstract With a unique data set from New Zealand which allows us to assign
each bet to individual bettors, we analyze the impact of experience on behavior and
success in non-parimutuel (fixed odds) sports betting markets. We find that expe-
rienced bettors bet more on favorites than inexperienced bettors do. Average
returns, which we use as success measure, increase with experience even after
controlling for odds. This means that the higher return of experienced bettors cannot
only be attributed to betting more on favorites. To get a more detailed picture, we
divide the data set into ten equally large subgroups, sorted by experience. We find
that odds decrease from subgroup to subgroup, while success consistently increases.
This shows that the positive impact of experience is not mainly driven by profes-
sional bettors.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the impact of experience on behavior and success in sports
betting markets. Our data set contains all 5,136,660 non-parimutuel bets placed at
the monopolistic New Zealand betting agency, the New Zealand Racing Board
(NZRB) between August 2006 and April 2009. In the non-parimutuel betting mode,
bettors get the odds they bet on; irrespectively of the development of these odds
over time.
As the data set allows us to assign each bet to a single bettor, we can measure the
experience of bettors. We approximate experience by the total amount invested and
by the number of bets placed up to each bet considered. We find that experience has
two positive effects: first, the odds of bets placed are decreasing in experience. As
our data set reveals a strong FLB, this is a first reason why experienced bettors are
more successful. The FLB expresses the largely robust phenomenon that average
returns on favorites are higher than those on longshots (Ottaviani and Soerensen
2008 for an overview on different explanations of the phenomenon). Second,
experience leads to higher success, defined as the average of returns, even after
controlling for odds. Thus, the positive effect of experience cannot exclusively be
explained by the lower susceptibility to the overweighting of small probabilities. To
the best of our knowledge, such an analysis has never been carried out before as the
data sets utilized so far did not allow tracking the wagering record of individual
bettors over time.
Recent empirical literature has demonstrated that a plausible explanation for the
FLB might be seen in the interplay of casual bettors and (semi-)professionals who
benefit from the fact that favorites are underbet (Gandhi and Serrano-Padial 2012).
To investigate if the impact of experience on odds and success is exclusively driven
by large investors, we divide the population into ten equally large subgroups, sorted
by experience. This leads to a surprisingly consistent picture, showing that odds are
decreasing from subgroup to subgroup. Accordingly, success is constantly
increasing between subgroups. We hence conclude that the positive effect of
experience cannot exclusively be attributed to large investors but rather holds for
any degree of experience. This indicates that there are strong learning effects with
respect to the overweighting of small probabilities.
Another point we are interested in is the relationship between odds and bet sizes.
Due to a lack of data, the overwhelming majority of the literature estimating
preferences from odds and outcomes has assumed that bet sizes are independent of
odds (e.g., the seminal paper by Jullien and Salanie´ 2000). This assumption,
however, is implausible as few bettors are willing to invest high amounts on
outcomes with a success probability of 5 %, for instance. For our data set, we
indeed find that bet sizes are, for all levels of experience, consistently decreasing in
odds. Although this result is perfectly intuitive, it seems to be important as it implies
that all models estimating preferences from the data by assuming equal bet sizes are
likely to be biased (Kopriva 2009).
As a side step of this analysis, we investigate the relationship between odds and
the variance of returns. We are interested in this as it seems reasonable to view the
variance as a (though clearly imperfect) proxy for the risk of bets. For purely
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arithmetical reasons, the variance of the return for a bet on longshots is higher when
bet sizes are independent of odds. If there are just two possible outcomes and bet
sizes on favorites and longshots are proportional to win probabilities (that is,
inversely proportional to fair odds), then the variance of return is the same for both
bets. As bet sizes decrease in odds, the relation between the variance and odds per
bet is an open empirical question. When we do not control for experience, we find
that the variance per bet is, on average, decreasing in odds. Controlling for
experience, however, shows that this result is driven by large investors who bet high
amounts on favorites. This finding is reinforced by our separation into subgroups:
the variance is significantly increasing in odds for the first nine subgroups, but
significantly decreasing in odds for the subgroup with the highest experience.
We now relate to the literature. Most fundamentally, our data set confirms the
FLB. When we define favorites as the bottom fifty percent lowest odds placed and
longshots as the other fifty percent, losses with longshots are on average almost
90 % higher than those with favorites. The FLB has proven to be largely robust with
respect to sports, countries and the estimation method (Ottaviani and Soerensen
2008; Forrest and McHale 2007; Winter and Kukuk 2006), and only a few papers
find a reversed FLB (Woodland and Woodland 1994, Sobel and Travis Raines
2003). The main focus of the existing empirical literature on wagering is to
investigate the explanatory power of different theories on behavior under risk for the
FLB. Most of the literature is based on the representative bettor approach which
assumes that risk preferences of all bettors are identical, and that bet sizes are
independent of odds. Based on these assumptions, most of the literature has found
that prospect theory fits the data much better than expected utility theory (Jullien
and Salanie´ 2000, 2008; Ottaviani and Soerensen 2008). Snowberg and Wolfers
(2010) provide additional evidence that the FLB can better be explained by an
overweighting of small probabilities in the framework of prospect theory compared
to risk-seeking behavior based on the expected utility theory.
We are aware of three other papers accounting for different bet sizes. While
Bradley (2003) provides a theoretical model based on prospect theory, Kopriva
(2009) and Andrikogiannopoulou (2010) seem to be the only other empirical papers
having data on bet sizes. Kopriva’s data set is from betfair.com which differs
significantly from the usual betting platforms. On betfair.com, bettors can post limit
orders where they stipulate at which odds they would be willing to trade. As on
share markets, it then depends on the clearing price whether bets are put through or
not. Kopriva shows that the estimation results for risk preferences change
considerably when controlling for bet sizes. Our paper simply demonstrates that
the negative correlation between odds and bet sizes is an important empirical fact
which holds for all levels of experience. Andrikogiannopoulou (2010) has randomly
picked data on hundred bettors from a large betting company which she uses to
estimate individual risk preferences.
A vastly growing literature emphasizes the importance to take the heterogeneity
of bettors into account. In an early theoretical contribution, Shin (1991) explains the
FLB as an equilibrium phenomenon in a non-parimutuel betting market with
sophisticated and unsophisticated bettors. Hurley and McDonough (1995) explain
the FLB for parimutuel betting with a dichotomy of informed and uninformed
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bettors who are both assumed to be risk neutral. In fact, Andrikogiannopoulou
(2010) finds a large heterogeneity in the risk preferences of the hundred bettors
considered in her data set. Andrikogiannopoulou and Papakonstantinou (2011)
argue that the FLB is exploited by about 2 % of all bettors earning positive returns.
Recently, Gandhi and Serrano-Padial (2012) challenge the predominant view on the
superiority of prospect theory by emphasizing that previous results were driven by
the assumption of homogenous bettors. An innovative approach is taken by
Chiappori et al. (2012) who estimate the heterogeneity in risk preferences not from
individual betting behavior, but from aggregated data on a large data set with
different horse races. They also confirm a large heterogeneity and that expected
utility theory performs rather poorly in explaining the data. Our data set reveals that
the overweighting of small probabilities, which plays an important role in
estimating preferences based on prospect theory, is largely connected to experience.
In this sense, the heterogeneity of preferences is related to experience. Our analysis,
however, does not support the view that betting behavior can be well explained by
assuming just two types of bettors.
Finally, while there are no other papers with experience data, some observations
in the literature are in line with our results. Gandar et al. (2001) use data for
parimutuel betting in New Zealand and show that a large part of the FLB is
eliminated by late bettors. As one might presume that late bets are more likely to be
placed by experienced bettors, this is consistent with our finding that experienced
bettors are far less prone to the FLB. Finally, Gramm, McKinney and Owens (2012)
also find an FLB in their data set from the horse race market in the US, but show
that the results are not pronounced enough for identifying profitable betting
strategies. This corresponds to our result that, even though experienced bettors are
far more successful than inexperienced bettors, their average gains are slightly
negative, so that there seem to be no systematically profitable betting strategies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 presents the data. In
Sect. 3, we explain betting behavior, and in Sect. 4, we turn to betting success. Sect.
5 concludes and points to further research.
2 Data
In close cooperation with the ‘New Zealand Racing Board’ (NZRB) which is the
only licensed betting agency in New Zealand, we have compiled a data set
consisting of all 5,136,660 non-parimutuel bets placed at the agency between
August 2006 and April 2009. Non-parimutuel betting (fixed-odds betting) means
that bettors get exactly the current quota (the odds) they bet on. If odds change over
time, then different bettors get different odds, and we use the last available odds in
all of our tables and regressions.
The first row in Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all bets. Odds are
relatively high with an arithmetic mean of 8.42 which is due to the fact that there are
many sports with a large number of possible outcomes. Consequently, average odds
are low for sports with just two outcomes such as tennis and baseball. Average
losses amount to around 14.4 % which shows that the monopolistic agency NZRB
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charges high take-out-rates. Average bet sizes are slightly above 50NZ$. The
exchange rate of the NZ$ to the Euro fluctuated over the observation period, but on
average, 1NZ$ was about 45 Cent.
To illustrate the impact of odds on the return of bets, we next distinguish between
favorites defined as the bottom fifty percent lowest odds placed and longshots
defined by the other fifty percent. As shown in Table 1, the return on favorites is -
9.78 % compared to -19.00 % for longshots, so that the descriptive statistics
already reveals a large FLB (columns five and six). As a robustness check, we next
define favorites as outcomes with a probability of winning above 50 % (columns
seven and eight). This reduces the percentage of bets on favorites from 50 to 21.5 %
as many sports allow for more than two possible outcomes. Consequently, average
losses on favorites are now only around 6.75 %. Disaggregating by sports shows
that the FLB is robust.
Recall that all averages in Table 1 are taken over bets. When taking instead
averages over bettors, then each bettor enters with the same weight, and bets of
infrequent bettors are hence overrepresented. Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for
bettors and shows that each bettor has, on average, placed around 73 bets with a
maximum of more than 14,500 bets, though. Average amounts invested were
3,685NZ$, but this high average is partly driven by some large investors. In
particular, there are 386 bettors who invested more than 100,000NZ$ during the
observation period. Due to the fact that averages are now taken over bettors instead
of bets, and since frequent bettors are more successful, average losses are now
22.72 % instead of 14.39 %.
As mentioned in the introduction, we use two proxies for experience.
ExpAmount measures for each bet the total amount invested so far in 1,000NZ$.
ExpNumber is the number of bets already placed by a bettor.
3 Betting behavior
We now start the analysis by investigating betting behavior. All regressions in the
paper are OLS with sports-fixed effects. Dummies for the different sports are needed
as we know from the descriptive statistics that average odds vary largely among
sports.
Model 1 in Table 3 shows that odds and bet sizes are negatively correlated as
expected. This result is robust with respect to the experience measures added in the
next Models. The size of the bet-size coefficient basically does not change when
adding the experience measures. The coefficient in the first specification means that
Table 2 Descriptive statistics on bettors
Number of
bettors
Number of bets Total amount invested Return
Average Median Min Max Average Median Min Max
Bettors 70,400 72.96 10 1 14,538 3,685 175 5 24,900,000 -22.72 %
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Table 3 Odds
Odds model 1 Odds model 2 Odds model 3 Odds model 4
Bet size -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0003***





Baseball -5.663*** -5.655*** -5.613*** -5.612***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069)
Basketball -5.444*** -5.438*** -5.414*** -5.413***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Cricket -3.663*** -3.664*** -3.654*** -3.656***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Football -0.077 -0.079 -0.073 -0.075
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Golf 17.46*** 17.46*** 17.48*** 17.48***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Harness 2.832*** 2.835*** 2.832*** 2.834***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Others -2.439*** -2.437*** -2.420*** -2.420***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Rugby League -0.343*** -0.344*** -0.341*** -0.342***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Rugby Union -0.0994** -0.102** -0.105** -0.106**
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Tennis -5.064*** -5.063*** -5.043*** -5.045***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Thoroughbred 2.774*** 2.778*** 2.776*** 2.778***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Constant 7.920*** 7.924*** 7.958*** 7.957***
(0.044) (0.0442094) (0.044) (0.0443)
Number of observations 5,136,660 5,136,660 5,136,660 5,136,660
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
OLS regression. Bet size is the amount for the respective bet in NZ$. Greyhounds are the reference
categories for sports. Coefficients are bold and standard errors are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively. ExpAmount is the amount so far betted by an
individual in 1,000NZ$ and ExpNumber is the number of bets so far placed by an individual bettor. The
Models differ only with respect to the control variables for experience: In model 1, we do not control for
experience. Model 2 adds ExpAmount, and model 3 ExpNumber. Model 4 controls for both experience
measures
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a 1,000NZ$ increase in bet size results in a decrease of odds by 0.3955. As the two
experience measures are correlated at 0.16, we consider them first separately.
In model 2, we add ExpAmount which measures for each bet the total amount
invested so far in 1,000NZ$. ExpAmount has a highly significant negative impact
on odds, that is, the exposure to the FLB decreases with experience. A higher
betting experience of 1,000NZ$ leads, on average, to a decrease in odds by 0.0004.
We will argue below, however, that the coefficient underestimates the impact of
experience on the behavior of average bettors; see the discussion after Table 5.
In model 3, we substitute ExpAmount by ExpNumber which measures the
number of bets already placed by a bettor. This experience proxy also has a highly
significant negative sign. If the number of bets placed so far increases by 1,000,
odds decrease on average by 0.08. Finally, we add both experience measures in
model 4. Due to their correlation, both coefficients are now slightly smaller than
before.
Given that bet sizes are decreasing in odds, it is interesting to see how the final
odds set by the monopolistic betting agency differ from odds which would be
realized at the totalisator (parimutuel-betting market), and which would just be
given by the ratio of the amount bet on the correct outcome and the overall amount.
Figure 1 shows two alternatives for calculating the subjective probabilities: The
dotted line just calculates the inverse of odds, while the straight line uses the quota
which would have occurred from a parimutuel-betting market (totalisator) and thus
divides the money bet on the correct outcome by the overall money invested in the
event. Both subjective probabilities are displayed as functions of the objective
probabilities that are the percentages of successful bets on the respective odds.
While the inverse of odds reflects (partly) the behavior of bookmakers, the
probabilities calculated according to the totalisator reflect exclusively the behavior







0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
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Fig. 1 Probabilities (odds in the data vs. totalisator calculation)
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(longshots) have lower odds than it would be the case in a parimutuel-betting
market.
Our result that odds are decreasing in both experience measures can be
interpreted in different ways. A first interpretation suggested in the literature
discussed in the introduction could be that some large and sophisticated investors
take advantage of the FLB caused by non-professional bettors (Andrikogiannop-
oulou and Papakonstantinou 2011). Second, it could be that there are learning
effects with respect to the overweighting of small probabilities for all experience
levels. As our data set contains a non-negligible number of large investors realizing
higher average returns than casual bettors, we cannot exclude per se that our results
are exclusively driven by a small group of large bettors. To account for this, we redo
our four regressions on odds by excluding the 1 % of bettors who have invested the
highest overall amounts in the period covered by our data set, as well as by
excluding the 1 % of bettors who placed the highest overall number of bets. The
1 % threshold is arbitrary, but we have duplicated all regressions with 3 and 5 %
limits and results are qualitatively the same. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics
for the two subgroups.
Table 4 reveals that, in the New Zealand betting market, there are some bettors
who have invested surprisingly large amounts. When considering only bettors who
have invested the 1 % highest amounts during our observation period (second row
in Table 4), then the average amount invested is more than 240,000NZ$. Recall that
this is not the average amount invested over the whole observation period, but the
average amount invested so far when considering each bet in the data set, so that
average amounts over the whole observation period are even higher. Average losses
for these large investors are very close to zero (-0.89 %), and for some betting
accounts, we observe considerable positive gains. This confirms that the positive
effect of experience found in our data set is indeed particularly pronounced for
highly experienced bettors.
The marginal investor defining the 1 % threshold has spent 52,712NZ$, so that
arguing that individuals below this threshold are non-professional bettors seems
sensible. Note that those who have placed the highest number of bets are only
slightly more successful than average bettors with a return of -12 %. This confirms
the prior that those investing high amounts may be considered as professionals,
rather than those betting with a high frequency. Consequently, we restrict our
presentation to the case where we take out those bettors who have invested the
highest amounts. Neglecting instead the bettors with the highest numbers of bets
leads to results which are basically identical to our original results derived with the
entire data set. Table 5 presents our regression results.
Comparing the results in Table 5 to those in Table 3 where large investors are
included shows that bet sizes and experience have qualitatively the same impacts,
but the coefficients are now much higher. For instance, the coefficient for
ExpAmount is now around two hundred times higher compared to the regression
results displayed in Table 3. To see the reason, consider a simple example where we
have just two bettors, a relatively inexperienced bettor with ExpAmount = 100
betting on a longshot with odds of 12, and a somewhat more experienced bettor with
ExpAmount = 1,000 betting on a longshot with odds of 10. Now, add a very
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experienced bettor with ExpAmount = 10,000,000 who bets on a favorite with odds
of 1.5. Due to the fact that even the most experienced bettors cannot bet on odds
below one, including these bettors reduce the coefficient to a large extent. Thus, the
results shown in Table 5 are more appropriate for assessing the quantitative impact
of experience on average bettors than those displayed in Table 3.
So far, the analysis shows that our results on the positive impact of experience
hold without the largest investors. To get a more detailed picture, our next step is to
divide the population into ten equally large subgroups, sorted by experience. We use
ExpAmount as proxy for experience, and the results are again robust when
ExpNumber is used instead.
Figure 2 shows that odds are consistently decreasing from subgroup to subgroup.
This indicates that the positive impact of experience is not (at least not exclusively)
driven by a dichotomy of professional and recreational gamblers, but holds also for
casual bettors. In this sense, our findings contradict arguments that the FLB can be
explained by the interplay of casual bettors and (semi-)professionals who are not
prone to the FLB (Gandhi and Serrano-Padial 2012). Learning seems to be
important at any experience level, and it helps to reduce the overweighting of small
probabilities. This is something Gandhi and Serrano-Padial (2012) cannot account
for as they do not have experience measures in their data set.
Note that Fig. 2 also shows that experience is largely unequally distributed
between bettors. For instance, the first 30 % of all bettors (see the upper limit for
this centile) have invested \40NZ$, and experience increases only slowly from
centile to centile. Only in the last two centiles, we observe a large difference
between the lower and the upper bound. Note, however, that we nevertheless
observe a significant and quantitatively non-negligible difference in the behavior
between the lower centiles. In other words, bettors who rarely ever bet are in fact
more prone to the FLB than those who bet regularly, even if the latter group invests
relatively low amounts.
The same disaggregation into subgroups shows that bet sizes are consistently
increasing from subgroup to subgroup. We do not need to report the figures here.
Average bet sizes increase from 6.11 in the subgroup with the lowest experience
level to 70.73 in the group with the highest experience level. Finally, if we run
separate regressions of odds on bet sizes, we find that odds are decreasing in bet
sizes in all subgroups. This is significant at the 1 % level in all subgroups. The
coefficients of bet sizes range from a minimum of -0.0003 (subgroup 10) to a

















All bettors 70,400 73.0 3684.9 50 8.42 50.50 -0.144
Highest amounts
(1 %)
704 1,135.1 241,535.8 109,230 6.41 212.80 -0.009
Highest number
of bets (1 %)
702 2,044.8 87,951.5 29,784 7.60 43.01 -0.120
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Table 5 Odds without large investors
Odds model 5 Odds model 6 Odds model 7 Odds model 8
Bet size -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.009***





Baseball -5.892*** -5.787*** -5.823*** -5.839***
0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087
Basketball -5.599*** -5.513*** -5.543*** -5.553***
0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070
Cricket -3.972*** -4.044*** -3.939*** -4.115***
0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065
Football -0.119* -0.196*** -0.099 -0.252***
0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062
Golf 17.13*** 17.06*** 17.17*** 16.98***
0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077
Harness 2.882*** 2.872*** 2.883*** 2.867***
0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063
Others -2.272*** -2.325*** -2.244*** -2.383***
0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069
Rugby League -0.672*** -0.786*** -0.664*** -0.842***
0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057
Rugby Union -0.315*** -0.483*** -0.333*** -0.526***
0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056
Tennis -5.284*** -5.266*** -5.218*** -5.346***
0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074
Thoroughbred 2.830*** 2.799*** 2.827*** 2.792***
0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054
Constant 8.506*** 8.935*** 8.652*** 8.912***
0.051 0.052 0.051 0.052
Number of observations 4,337,575 4,337,575 4,337,575 4,337,575
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
OLS regression. Bet size is the amount for the respective bet in NZ$. Greyhounds are the reference
categories for sports. Coefficients are bold and standard errors are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively. ExpAmount is the amount so far betted by an
individual in 1,000NZ$ and ExpNumber is the number of bets so far placed by an individual bettor. The
models differ only with respect to the control variables for experience: In model 5, we do not control for
experience. Model 6 adds ExpAmount, and model 7 ExpNumber. Model 8 controls for both experience
measures
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maximum of 0.53 (subgroup 1) when we define the highest experienced group as
group ten.
In the following, we consider the impact of odds on the variance of returns of
bets. This is interesting because the literature based on expected utility theory has
associated betting on longshots with higher risk preferences than betting on
favorites. This follows immediately when assuming that bet sizes are independent of
odds. However, in the simplest case with only two possible outcomes, the variance
of the return per bet is independent of odds if bet sizes are proportional to win
probabilities (we are grateful to an anonymous referee who has pointed this out). It
hence depends on the degree of the negative correlation of odds and bet sizes
whether the variance increases or decreases in odds. Table 6 presents our results.
Model 9 in Table 6 presents the results when we control only for the different
sports. We then find that the variance decreases in odds. This means that bet sizes
are so largely shrinking in odds that this overcompensates the direct effect of odds
on the variance. The result is significant with a p value below 0.001, but given the
huge data set with more than five million observations, this does not necessarily
mean that the effect is notable. The coefficient shown in Model 9 expresses that
increasing the odds by 1 leads to a lower variance of about 1,442. The average
variance over all bets is around 209,000. In any case, the variance does not increase
in odds. Thus, if one accepts the variance of the return as a reasonable proxy for the
risk associated with a bet, there seems so far no reason for assuming that the risk of
the average bet actually placed increases in odds.
However, the coefficient of odds changes sign as soon as we add ExpAmount as a
control variable (models 10 and 12). The reason is that large investors do not only
invest large overall amounts, but also high amounts per bet. And as these amounts
are placed on favorites, the favorite bets placed by these bettors exhibit a
particularly large variance. This effect is very pronounced, and is responsible for the
results in Table 6. Therefore, part of the high variance of favorite bets is now
absorbed by ExpAmount. Consequently, odds have a positive sign when controlling
for the amounts invested. By contrast, the coefficient for odds does basically not
change compared to model 9 when we add ExpNumber instead of ExpAmount.
ExpNumber itself has a negative sign which is not surprising as high-frequency
bettors often invest low amounts per bet. In other words, bet sizes are ceteris paribus
decreasing in the number of bets when controlling for the overall amount.
Fig. 2 Odds, sorted by
experience. Horizontal axis
centiles for ExpAmount. The
numbers in brackets show the
lowerand upper bounds for the
respective centiles. Vertical axis
average odds of betsplaced for
the respective centiles
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Odds -1,442*** 2,956*** -1,4534*** 2,751***





Baseball 1,574,153*** 238,707*** 1,598,911*** 916,447***
(69,576) (63,661) (69,734) (63,628)
Basketball 539,745*** -416,507*** 554,315*** -22,069
(59,515) (54,452) (59,578) (54,362)
Cricket 52,911 124,306** 57,144 247,949***
(57,984) (5,304) (57,989) (52,909)
Football 46,828 213,718*** 49,027 281,312***
(54,989) (50,304) (54,991) (50,174)
Golf 123,550* 307,202*** 132,079* 557,361***
(69,260) (63,359) (69,279) (63,211)
Harness 55,814 -286,481*** 56,040 -288,833***
(55,848) (51,090) (55,848) (50,956)
Others 384,832*** 37,753 394,400*** 304,027***
(60,263) (55,129) (60,291) (55,009)
Rugby League 86,648* 156,922*** 87,715* 189,433***
(50,194) (45,917) (50,194) (45,797)
Rugby Union 171,197*** 34,5015*** 168,499*** 271,880***
(49,218) (45,024) (49,221) (44,909)
Tennis 256,635*** -160,591*** 267,102*** 129,759**
(63,859) (58,419) (63,890) (58,293)
Thoroughbred 94,630** -275,832*** 95,327** -265,351***
(47,476) (43,432) (47,476) (43,318)
Constant 49,572 -733,839*** 68,478 -210,201***
(45,063) (41,231) (45,205) (41,246)
Number of
observations
5,136,660 5,136,660 5,136,660 5,136,660
R2 0.0002 0.17 0.0002 0.17
OLS regression. Bet size is the amount for the respective bet in NZ$. Greyhounds are the reference
categories for sports. Coefficients are bold and standard errors are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively. ExpAmount is the amount so far betted by an
individual in 1,000NZ$ and ExpNumber is the number of bets so far placed by an individual bettor. The
models differ only with respect to the control variables for experience: In model 9, we do not control for
experience. Model 10 adds ExpAmount, and Model 11 ExpNumber. Model 12 controls for both expe-
rience measures
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Table 7 Success
Return model 13 Return model 14 Return model 15 Return model 16
Odds -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***





Baseball 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Basketball 0.08*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.078***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Cricket 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Football 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Golf 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Harness 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Others 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.043***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Rugby League -0.001 -0.0005 -0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Rugby Union -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Tennis 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Thoroughbred 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.042***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.156*** -0.156***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of observations 5,136,660 5,136,660 5,136,660 5,136,660
R2 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
OLS regression. Bet size is the amount for the respective bet in NZ$. Greyhounds are the reference
categories for sports. Coefficients are bold and standard errors are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively. ExpAmount is the amount so far betted by an
individual in 1,000NZ$ and ExpNumber is the number of bets so far placed by an individual bettor. The
models differ only with respect to the control variables for experience: In model 13, we do not control for
experience. Model 14 adds ExpAmount, and model 15 ExpNumber. Model 16 controls for both expe-
rience measures
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Table 8 Success without large investors
Return model 17 Return model 18 Return model 19 Return model 20
Odds -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***





Baseball 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.073***
0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Basketball 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.085***
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Cricket 0.03*** 0.032*** 0.03*** 0.033***
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Football 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.037***
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Golf 0.01 0.011 0.009 0.012
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Harness 0.11*** 0.111*** 0.11*** 0.111***
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Others 0.049*** 0.05*** 0.049*** 0.051***
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Rugby league 0.01 0.012* 0.01 0.013*
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Rugby union -0.0003 0.003 0.000002 0.004
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Tennis 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.04***
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Thoroughbred 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.042***
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Constant -0.167*** -0.175*** -0.169*** -0.175***
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Number of observations 4,337,575 4,337,575 4,337,575 4,337,575
R2 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
OLS regression. Bet size is the amount for the respective bet in NZ$. Greyhounds are the reference
categories for sports. Coefficients are bold and standard errors are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively. ExpAmount is the amount so far betted by an
individual in 1,000NZ$ and ExpNumber is the number of bets so far placed by an individual bettor. The
models differ only with respect to the control variables for experience: In model 17, we do not control for
experience. Model 18 adds ExpAmount, and model 19 ExpNumber. Model 20 controls for both expe-
rience measures
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Again, it is instructive to consider the ten subgroups, ordered by ExpAmount,
separately. Not surprising, we find that the variance per bet increases from subgroup
to subgroup. More interesting results are obtained when we run regressions on the
variance of odds for each of the ten subgroups. We then find that the variance
increases in odds for the first nine subgroups, but decreases in odds for the subgroup
with the largest investors; all significant at the 1 %-level. Thus, for all subgroups but
the one with the highest experience, bet sizes and odds are negatively correlated, but
at a degree which does not overcompensate the direct effect of odds on variance.
4 Betting success
We now turn to the impact of experience on betting success.
Table 7 reveals that higher odds have a significantly negative impact on the
return and hence confirm the existence of the FLB. In addition, our experience
measures—ExpAmount and ExpNumber—display an impact on outcomes, too. We
control for odds, taking into account that experienced bettors are less prone to the
FLB and state that experience has a positive impact on the return. We conclude that
experienced bettors are more successful due to two reasons: the play better odds and
they choose a better selection within odds. Whether we use ExpNumber,
ExpAmount or both to illustrate does not change the results qualitatively.
Not considering the 1 % largest bettors in Table 8 even intensifies the effect of
experience measured by the amounts. The coefficient of ExpAmount is 25 times
higher in model 18 and 67 times higher in model 20 compared to the respective
models in Table 7.
Finally, we consider again the success in the ten different subgroups sorted by
experience.
Figure 3 shows that success consistently increases with experience which
reinforces the view that the positive effect of experience is not limited to (semi-
)professional bettors. Running separate regressions show that success decreases in
odds for all ten subgroups. This, however, does not provide new insights as this
result is already implied by the FLB.
Fig. 3 Success, sorted by
experience. Horizontal axis
centiles for ExpAmount. The
numbers in brackets show the
lowerand upper bounds for the
respective centiles. Vertical axis
average odds of betsplaced for
the respective centiles
232 Business Research (2014) 7:217–234
123
5 Conclusion
Our data set consisting of more than five million bets placed in the non-parimutuel
betting mode New Zealand between August 2006 and April 2009 is unique as it
allows assigning each bet to individual bettors. This enables us to analyze the
impact of experience on betting behavior and success. We approximate experience
by the amount invested and by the number of bets placed up to each bet considered.
Experience increases success for two reasons: it reduces the susceptibility to the
overweighting of small probabilities, and leads to higher success even after
controlling for odds. To the best of our knowledge, such an analysis has never been
carried out before as the data sets utilized so far did not allow tracking the wagering
record of individual bettors over time.
An important question is whether the positive effect of experience can best be
explained by a dichotomy of experienced and recreational bettors. As for this, we
divide the population into ten equally large subgroups, sorted by experience. We
show that odds are consistently decreasing from subgroup to subgroup. Thus, the
positive effect of experience cannot exclusively be attributed to large investors but
rather holds for any degree of experience. This indicates that there are strong
learning effects with respect to the overweighting of small probabilities.
We acknowledge a limitation for our results on experience. We find a strong
positive relationship between experience and success, but we did not so far separate
between selection effects (heterogeneity of bettors) and learning effects. In other
words, we have not disentangled yet if smarter individuals bet more or if betting
more increases the knowledge about the probability distribution over outcomes.
This requires an instrumental variable for the decision to leave the market, and we
were not successful yet in searching for such an instrument. This must hence be left
to further research.
As a side effect of our analysis, we show that bet sizes and odds are negatively
correlated at all levels of experience. This supports two current empirical papers
(Kopriva 2009 and Andrikogiannopoulou 2010) showing that accounting for
different bet sizes is important when estimating preferences from the data.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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